From the archivist's point of view, the bibliography of primary sources is not very satisfactory and it entirely lacks any annotation as to the volume of records and papers examined or the relative value of the sources. One seeks in vain for any comment on the lack of original documentation for the various railway companies involved, excepting one reference in the text itself. One must also question whether the author examined the archives of the City of Quebec, or of the Canadian Pacific and Canadian National Railways; and whether these contained anything of value to his research. It should be noted that much statistical information is taken from sources not of a primary nature, and should be accepted by readers on that basis. In the bibliography of printed works examined there is no reference to any of Sir Sandford Fleming's published volumes, even though there are several references to works on American railway construction. Equally overlooked are addresses from which researchers could obtain access to various printed pamphlets and printed documents cited in the bibliography. There is also no reference to any use of cartographic or photographic archival material which may have been consulted by the author in the course of his work.

The volume, over all, is well written and presented in an attractive format. It must be hoped that Brian Young will have future contributions to make to Canadian historiography.

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Obviously the fact that a nation plans for war with a specific opponent does not necessarily mean that it is likely to go to war against that country. It does, however, usually imply that some officials at least consider a war between the two nations to be a possibility—even if a remote one. It is one of the responsibilities of the military forces in any country to prepare for the defence of their homeland in the event of every possible war. This can even include planning for war with a friendly neighbour.

Richard Preston, the respected Canadian military historian who is Director of Canadian Studies and W.K. Boyd Professor of History at Duke University in Durham, N.C., has written a good book on just such contingency planning for war in North America. He discusses British and Canadian contingency plans for war with the United States, as well as American plans for war with Canada, the latter in particular considered as part of a larger war between Britain and the United States. The prospect is not as ridiculous as it at first appears. To believe so is to be guilty of the old historiographical sin of reading history backwards. Canada and the United States have not always enjoyed relations as cordial as those often taken for granted by the present generation. Professor Preston reminds us that the progress from military confrontation at the time of the American Revolution to the military partnership of today was slow—and considerably less obvious at any given time than it appears in retrospect. In telling his story of contingency war planning, he provides some interesting insights into one aspect of the evolution in Canadian-American relations from hostility to co-operation, as well as into the extent to which the military establishments in Canada and the United States could undertake war planning.

Despite the inclusive dates of the title, the story Preston tells is a complete one. His introductory essay on “The Military Factor in Canadian-American Relations” leads quite naturally to a starting point of 1775 rather 1867 as advertised in the subtitle, a more complete and better approach. The discussion is chronological, with chapter ar-
Rangement influenced by basic North American, imperial and world issues. His final few paragraphs in the last chapter bring the story up to the present, with the concluding sentence frankly summing up the situation: "The future independence of Canada may continue to rest ultimately on American forebearance" (p. 233).

However, not everybody on both sides of the border always believed that any struggle would be obviously one-sided. It is this fact which makes the book viable and interesting. There were always officers in Canada and the United States who worried about not only the possibility of war between these two countries, but about the outcome of such a conflict as well. This is despite, or perhaps because of, the fact that these unmilitary nations "...were never prepared for war with each other" (p. 5). This might not say much for the influence of the men who drafted the plans discussed by Preston.

At times it is difficult to know how seriously to take the whole question. Preston admits that "...planners habitually ignored the realities of the political situation, the planning...has an air of fantasy" (p. 193). Some of the war planning was simply part of training, where it is not unnatural to use a contiguous country for exercise purposes. It is virtually impossible to separate planning as an educational device from the real thing because, as Preston explains, for a time in the nineteenth century and early twentieth, the U.S. War Colleges were actually responsible for war planning. In addition, the number of U.S. plans for war with Britain might have been inordinately high because after the First World War the American public would not have tolerated planning for war with Germany, so plans were made for war with Britain instead. In the event of war with Germany the appropriate changes could have been made quite easily. Somehow it was easier to plan for war with a friend than with a potential or recent enemy. Thus, in some cases it seems clear that Britain served as a kind of proxy for Germany in U.S. war planning.

This is a book which could probably only have been written by a scholar who had worked in the area for some time and had become thoroughly familiar with an impressive array of sources. The references, and especially the "Note on Sources", provide an ideal starting point for anybody wishing to pursue related questions, or indeed to study almost any aspect of Canadian military history since the eighteenth century. The book and the notes demonstrate that Preston clearly knows, understands, and appreciates the archival sources of his chosen field of study. He has used an impressive array of public and private archives in Canada, Britain, and the United States with only an occasional small slip. (An example of this is his citation "PAC, Hutton Papers, MG 21" with no indication of the additional manuscript number. A scholar of his experience should have known better. Some unlucky researcher—or archivist—might some day have an interesting time tracking down these Hutton references.)

On the whole this book offers complete and clear references which others could emulate. Unfortunately, as is too often the case, the publisher has done both the author and the reader a disservice by grouping the references at the back. This is a false economy in a relatively short academic monograph. Many readers will also regret the decision of the publisher to omit a dust jacket, employing instead a cover with impregnated design which reminds one of an old elementary school textbook. The result is an undeservedly unattractive book. This is lamentable, for nonspecialists who could benefit from reading The Defence of the Undefended Border might not be moved to pick it up. Even students of Canadian history who profess no interest in military subjects should find this book interesting and informative. Richard Preston has not written the definitive statement on the importance of the military factor in Canadian-American relations, but he has contributed to our understanding of the development of a unique friendship between two close neighbours.

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