difficiles, même si le malade doit se serrer la ceinture, il demeure à l'abri de la disette. En plus de lui assurer la guérison, l'Hôtel-Dieu le protège de la misère des temps.

Après avoir quantifié la ration quotidienne, Jacques Rousseau tente d'analyser l'apport calorifique des différentes composantes du régime alimentaire en faisant appel à des standards contemporains. Le régime de l'Hôtel-Dieu fournit en moyenne de 3 000 à 3 500 calories quotidiennement, niveau calorifique qui correspond aux besoins d'un travailleur actif. La répartition des protides, des lipides et des glucides ne présente pas d'insuffisances graves par rapport au total calorique, compte tenu des habitudes alimentaires de l'époque. Cependant deux précarences sont à signaler pour les vitamines A et C. Le régime hospitalier ne bouleverse pas les habitudes alimentaires de nos ancêtres et les religieuses y attachent une valeur thérapeutique.

Même si, comme le déplore Jacques Rousseau, "l'absence d'études précises et comparables sur l'alimentation des différents groupes sociaux en Nouvelle-France aussi bien que la rareté des documents significatifs constituent toutefois de sérieux obstacles à une analyse systématique du sujet," (p. 357) il n'en demeure pas moins que sa tentative de sonder le terrain, de rejoindre l'alimentation des plus nombreux, nous est, d'autant plus, précieuse. Dans l'ensemble, le régime alimentaire de l'Hôtel-Dieu participe à celui des groupes privilégiés car il assure au malade la guérison et son "pain quotidien."

Tout au cours de sa démarche, l'historien nous fait part de ses problèmes méthodologiques, problèmes liés à la tenue de livres rudimentaire des hospitalières, problèmes d'utilisation des standards contemporains, problèmes de conversion des mesures anciennes. De nombreux tableaux et graphiques illustrent ses propos tout en rompant, hélas, trop souvent la lecture. En plus de contribuer à l'ouverture d'une nouvelle piste de recherche, l'histoire de l'alimentation au Canada, cette étude du régime alimentaire de l'Hôtel-Dieu témoigne du sérieux et de la minutie de son auteur. Toutefois, nous sommes restée sur notre faim en ce qui a trait à l'étude de l'aspect symbolique du rituel, à l'analyse des conséquences physiologiques et psychologiques d'une telle alimentation. De plus, pourquoi avoir choisi un tel titre? Il ne rend pas justice à la recherche menée dans le cadre d'un milieu hospitalier, sans compter qu'il porte le lecteur à confusion en laissant croire qu'il s'agit davantage d'une étude sur la cuisine que sur l'alimentation.

Lucie Pagée

Centre de recherche en civilisation canadienne-française
Université d'Ottawa

Redcoats and Patriotes. The Rebellions in Lower Canada, 1837-38. ELINOR KYTE SENIOR. Stittsville, Ont.: Canada's Wings in collaboration with the Canadian War Museum, 1985. 218 p. ISBN 0-920002-25-5 \$29.95.

Redcoats and Patriotes is, to the best of this reviewer's knowledge, the first serious study of the Rebellions of 1837-38 in Lower Canada from the military point of view. It is an abridgement of a longer manuscript that is available for consultation in the Montreal Military and Maritime Archives and relates closely to the author's earlier work on the British regulars in Montreal. It is meticulously researched and includes excellent maps and pictorial material.

© All rights reserved: Archivaria 22 (Summer 1986)

In general terms, the story of the rebellions is well known to Canadians, but many new details are provided. Mrs. Senior describes the political and economic background of the unrest in both Lower and Upper Canada and outlines the differences of opinion among those who were striving for reform. The intimidation of loyalists and of those opposed to military action is vividly portrayed. Biographical details about all the principal figures are included, and the reader is reminded that Louis-Joseph Papineau and Wolfred Nelson fought on the British side, as officers in the 5th Battalion ("The Devil's Own"), during the War of 1812.

With regard to the British troops, the reader learns that when Sir John Colborne began his preparations to secure the countryside, legal niceties were strictly respected. The troops were to move merely as an aid to civil power. The Attorney General of Lower Canada supplied a requisition asking for military aid, and he made sure it was signed by one English-speaking and one French-speaking magistrate.

When the fighting began, the reader learns the strategy of each of the leaders, the location of each of the military units, where these units went, what weapons they had, what food they ate, and how the weather affected their progress. This latter factor was highly significant. For example, after the engagement at St-Denis, the British troops were compelled to abandon their howitzer because the wheels had become frozen in mud and seven hours of struggle had failed to release it. This was particularly humiliating to officers and men raised in the tradition of the Peninsular War that Wellington never lost a gun.

The state of intelligence systems on both sides is described, and the inconsistencies which normally occur in such systems are noted. Some information was conveyed accurately and with great speed; other information was delayed or erroneous, leading to miscalculations on both sides. Matters such as the treatment of the wounded and prisoners, and the care (or lack of it) of civilian refugees are also well covered.

After the battle of St-Eustache, the Patriotes appeared to have been defeated, but much resentment remained. In early 1838 Robert Nelson organized a new underground movement, the Frères Chasseurs, which featured a sophisticated organizational structure and intimidating rituals. But when the two major battles of 1838 took place, the leaders, Nelson and Colonel Oklowski, were not personally known to most of the insurgents. This inevitably affected morale. The insurrections of 1838 were defeated fairly easily.

Mrs. Senior identifies a number of reasons for the failure of the insurrections: that Great Britain cared enough about Canada to fight for it; that the majority of the population of Lower Canada did not support the use of force to gain political objectives; that anticipated foreign support, especially from the United States, was not forthcoming; and that some of the European mercenary soldiers proved as unreliable in battle as the local amateur military leaders. She also observes that in both 1837 and 1838 the top military leaders of the Patriotes tended to be drawn from outside the French-Canadian community while most of the insurgents were French-Canadian, a situation she describes as "fraught with distrust and suspicion."

Finally there is an excellent bibliographic note, which will be invaluable to all archivists and researchers working in this area.

Although the raison d'être of this book is its study of the military aspects of the rebellions, it will also be useful to all readers seeking a meticulously researched and

studiously impartial account of the tragic events of 1837-38 in Lower Canada. It is an important new contribution to the literature of these events.

Grace Hyam Manuscript Division Public Archives of Canada

The Rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada: A Collection of Documents. COLIN READ and RONALD J. STAGG, eds. Ottawa: The Champlain Society with Carleton University Press, 1985. c, 471 p. ISBN 0-88629-026-0 \$18.95 pa.

The Rebellion of 1837 in Upper Canada, edited by Colin Read and R.J. Stagg, is the most recent addition to the Champlain Society's Ontario Series. It presents a collection of 442 documents dealing with the political situation in the province leading up to, and including, the Mackenzie and Duncombe uprisings; activities in areas not threatened by the rebellion; and the immediate aftermath when order was restored. Following the general format of the series the editors, both specialists in the rebellion period, provide a lengthy introduction to the documents which illustrate their themes. The introduction draws on approximately one century of historiography to outline what has now become a familiar story: Reform grievances, especially the abuse of power by the executive and the issue of church-state links, are outlined; Tory attitudes and the activities of the British Constitutional Society in organizing loval supporters before the election of 1836 are noted; and Sir Francis Bond Head's provocations, plus British imperial policies, culminating in Lord John Russell's Ten Resolutions, are cited. Political tensions were exacerbated by the deepening economic crisis of 1836-37, which was marked by a short money supply, rising interest rates, and crop failures, and the consequent rise in the price of foodstuffs, which squeezed many Upper Canadian farmers. Their discontent was exploited in areas north of Toronto and in the London District by radicals such as William Lyon Mackenzie and Charles Duncombe. Mackenzie prepared a draft constitution promising social and economic democracy for Upper Canada which was reprinted by Reform newspapers; political unions sprouted in some parts of the province to organize the radicals. But as the authors conclude, the rebellion was finally a product of Mackenzie's frustrations; there was no general movement for revolution.

The discussion of the Toronto uprising, condensed from Stagg's doctoral dissertation, takes as its focus William Lyon Mackenzie. Although he was acting on the spur of the moment, he was able to win over prominent individuals such as John Rolph, Samuel Lount, and Peter Matthews and attract large audiences sympathetic to his interpretation of recent developments. Some supporters moved prematurely and three hundred to five hundred rebels gathered at Montgomery's Tavern in early December anticipating an easy march to "liberate" the capital. Toronto had no organized defences and Bond Head offered little leadership; he was originally willing to negotiate with Mackenzie through Rolph and Robert Baldwin. (Stagg does clarify the infamous Rolph incident. Rolph, who had been involved in preliminary discussions about the uprising and was suggested as the first president of the new republic, probably informed Mackenzie about the situation in Toronto while acting as Head's emissary under a flag of truce. The doctor would later deny that he was a traitor in the face of accusations by his opponents and corroboration from Mackenzie himself.) The rebels, who were poorly organized, became discouraged when they met resistance as the loyal forces quickly gathered to crush the uprising.

© All rights reserved: Archivaria 22 (Summer 1986)