

her own efforts, quite correctly as “an impressionistic sketch of the trip together” (p. 161). A great disappointment of her work is that, as a woman selected by a major newspaper to undertake such an arduous journey to the frontiers of Canadian territory in what was the height of the Victorian era, she does not present a very distinctive feminine perspective. There are some redeeming features, such as her descriptions of her travelling companions and her observations of various methods of transportation of humans and their supplies, but beyond these little in her writing distinguishes it from any of the hundreds of travelogues that abound.

If the book could be done over, the editor would be wiser to take extracts from the two contemporary accounts, reproduce the Cumming article in its entirety, and expand his own analysis of the Canadian militia and their role in the Yukon. As it stands, *Guarding the Goldfields* does not fulfil the promise of its title. The goldfields and the Yukon Field Force never really meet in this work.

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**Le 22<sup>e</sup> Bataillon (canadien-français) 1914-1919 Étude socio-militaire.** JEAN-PIERRE GAGNON. Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval en collaboration avec le Ministère de la Défense nationale et le Centre d'édition du gouvernement du Canada, 1986. 460 p. ISBN 2-7637-7097-5 \$29.00.

The organization of the 22nd (French Canadian) Battalion in October 1914 enjoyed neither public nor official favour. This unit, the only francophone battalion in the Canadian Expeditionary Force, owed its existence to the determination of Arthur Mignault, a wealthy Conservative medical doctor and Captain of the 65th Regiment. Mignault was backed by a bipartisan committee composed of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Lomer Gouin, Médéric Martin, and other French Canadian notables, as well as the unflagging efforts of the newspaper *La Presse*. Established to refute British charges of French Canadian disloyalty and apathy toward the war, this battalion's war record went well beyond the most optimistic expectations of its promoters. Its record included two Victoria and forty-six Military Crosses, and twenty-seven Distinguished Service Medals. Despite innumerable obstacles, its performance during the battles of Mount Sorrel, Courcelette, Regina Trench, Chérisy, Ypres, and Passchendaele made the name of the 22nd Battalion synonymous with military discipline, skill, and courage. In 1920, in recognition of its singular wartime record, 22nd Battalion (along with the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry) became an integral part of Canada's permanent military force.

Jean-Pierre Gagnon's *Le 22<sup>e</sup> Bataillon (canadien-français) 1914-1919* is neither a regimental history nor an hagiographical study, but a careful socio-military analysis of the organization, recruitment, training, life, and battle experience of the 22nd Battalion during the Great War. Originally presented as a doctoral thesis at Laval University,

Gagnon's book is based upon a thorough examination of existing archival sources and placed within the context of contemporary socio-military historiography in Canada and abroad. A careful analysis of the evidence enables Gagnon to establish the social character of the battalion's 4,426 volunteers and 1,158 conscripts, and assess their experience, comportment, and leadership.

Gagnon's study, though primarily a social analysis, is not blind to the political context of recruitment in Quebec. In contrast to some traditional studies which have stressed the role of anglophone prejudice in the alienation of French Canada from the war effort, Gagnon recognizes the deeply rooted French Canadian indifference to the war and the extent to which maladministration of Canada's war effort, our over-commitment, the chaos, conflicting orders, favouritism, and the licenced competition for the few willing bodies doomed the success of recruitment in French Canada. When the error was recognized on the eve of the conscription crisis and efforts were made to rectify the situation, the damage had already been done.

Those who succumbed to the wiles of the recruiting officer were scarcely representative of their society. Recruited largely in Montreal and its surroundings, the 22nd Battalion was composed predominately of young, single, urban, citizen soldiers, most of whom were unskilled workers in the building and manufacturing industries, many of them unemployed at the time of enlistment. A large number were bilingual, often from families where one parent was an anglophone. Although all but 4.5 per cent were Catholic, at least 11 per cent of the men were born outside of Canada.

Given the social and political obstacles to recruitment in French Canada, the 22nd Battalion's organization and survival was a considerable achievement. Of the fifteen or so "francophone" units authorized by the Department of Militia only the 22nd Battalion saw active service. The rest fell victim to the maladministration, confusion, incompetence, indifference, and maleficence which characterized recruitment in French Canada, and were eventually cannibalized to provide reinforcements for the 22nd.

What made the difference in the 22nd was leadership. The linguistic and cultural barriers which made promotion difficult beyond this francophone battalion, while prejudicial to able francophone officers and non-commissioned officers, left it with a relatively consistent core of experienced, tough, and inspired leaders such as Frédéric-Mondelet Gaudet, Thomas-Louis Tremblay, Arthur Dubuc, Georges Vanier, Henri Chassé, Jean Brillant, and Joseph Kaeble — the latter two recipients of the Victoria Cross. Thomas-Louis Tremblay, the dynamic thirty-year-old officer who retained command of the battalion from February 1916 until he was promoted to the interim command of the 5th Brigade in August 1918, proved to be a particularly inspired leader, proud of the French Canadian character of his unit and capable of getting the most from his officers and men.

The author makes it clear that the life of a francophone unit in an anglophone army was often far from comfortable. Written communications outside and within the unit were in English. Promotion was retarded by linguistic and cultural barriers and the men and officers were sometimes the object of unpleasant slurs, which Tremblay strongly resented. Gagnon's carefully researched and closely reasoned analysis provides insight into the history of one of Canada's most distinguished regiments. Well illustrated with charts, maps, and photographs, this book contains a good index, bibliography, and historiographical essay as well as a wealth of useful statistical information. In short,

Gagnon's book provides a model for future scholars; as such it is an excellent beginning to the Directorate of History of the Department of National Defence's proposed series on socio-military history.

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**Winning the Second Battle: Canadian Veterans and the Return to Civilian Life, 1915-1930.** DESMOND MORTON and GLENN WRIGHT. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. xiv, 328 p., illus., appendix. ISBN 0-8020-5705-5 cl. ISBN 0-8020-6634-8 pa. \$40.00 cl. \$17.97 pa.

In 1936, nearly a generation after the guns fell silent on the Western Front, the federal government at last erected its monument to Great War veterans. The grudging gesture was symbolic of Canada's reluctance to acknowledge the sacrifices of its citizen-soldiers. In this book, Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright describe in discouraging detail the struggle of returned men for recognition and re-establishment. In their skirmishes over bonuses, land settlement, and rehabilitation, yesterday's heroes fought public apathy, bureaucratic parsimony, and political indifference. Ultimately the veterans lost their battles but won their war. What they failed to gain for themselves they secured for their successors: programmes based on entitlement. But for most of the old soldiers, the victory came too late.

"Re-establishment," the authors conclude, "failed both its architects and its intended beneficiaries." Why? Although it initially gave little thought to the aftermath of what was expected to be a short war, the government soon recognized its error. Volunteerism, charity, and patriotic funds — the traditional responses — would not suffice for the survivors of the CEF. Drawing on the experience of Britain, France, and the United States, officials set about devising the principles, organizations, and facilities needed to cope with the casualties of modern war. The result, in the words of J.L. Todd of the Pensions Commission, was "a most perfect scheme." Based on hard business sense, a minimum of sentiment, and a coherent set of principles, Canada's re-establishment programme represented "as excellent a system as could be devised" for looking after the returned men. Through a combination of re-training, rehabilitation, and limited pension assistance, the government would ensure that veterans regained their economic self-sufficiency; "normalcy" would be quickly restored and the country's duty finally discharged.

Both the presumption and the expectation proved false. From the outset, fear, not generosity, animated the administrators. Todd, Ernest Scammell, and Walter Segsworth struggled to protect Canada from the menace of the pension evil. Self-styled trustees of the nation's future, they frequently responded to the veterans' problems with a meanness of spirit that refused to recognize the shortcomings of an approach more suited to imaginary clients than to the real victims of trench warfare. Private Pat represented the popular perception: though he had lost a leg he came back with spirit intact and a determination to put the war behind him. Fitted with an artificial limb, given a bit of retraining, and resettled on a prairie homestead, this plucky fellow would soon make a go