

actions — he fails to do the same kind of analysis of peace-oriented women's groups or, more importantly, to consider recent feminist historical and political theory on the strong inclination of women over the millennia to support peace in the first place; instead, women are mentioned only insofar as they contributed to the larger Canadian peace movement. Whether Socknat has actually "laid the groundwork for an important new dimension in Canadian social history," his study certainly points to possible new avenues of research. For example, although the study of feminism and peace is gaining more exposure, several studies on individual women and women's peace groups remain to be written to fill in the gaps in *Witness Against War*, as do more conceptual analyses of various churches and sects and related philosophical, religious, and feminist ideas. And, of course, this book tells only one part of the history of pacifism in Canada; a complementary study of the Canadian peace movement from 1945 to the present would be welcome.

Given the vast number of studies of Canadian involvement in the two world wars, it is amazing that somebody has not previously produced a comprehensive overview of the general opposition in Canada to direct involvement in war. *Witness Against War* is more than an overview, however. Not only does this book make the "war story" more complete by filling in previously untold portions of Canadian history, but it also provides a concise and critical historical analysis of an idea and its manifestation in Canada from 1900 to 1945. By making a Canadian minority come alive while tracing the development of the idea of pacifism, Thomas P. Socknat's contribution to Canadian social and intellectual history is long overdue and welcomed.

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No Boundaries Upstairs. Canada, the United States and the Origins of North American Air Defence, 1945-1958. JOSEPH T. JOCKEL. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1987. xiv, 166 p. ISBN 0-7748-0271-5 \$19.95.

This book is a very readable, well documented account of a fascinating period in Canadian-American defence relations from the end of World War Two until the establishment of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) in the spring of 1958. In the belief that the acrimony surrounding Canada's role in NORAD following its establishment has distorted public perceptions in Canada of the origins of Canadian-American defence cooperation, Professor Jockel set out to find answers to a number of key questions. For example, to what extent was air defence of the continent primarily an American project? When did Ottawa abandon its determination, so strongly professed at the end of the war, to undertake alone, or at least to control, all military activities on Canadian soil? Was the real purpose of NORAD to alert the Strategic Air Command rather than to defend the territory of Canada and the United States?

Professor Jockel has dealt with these and other issues brilliantly with just the right amount of historical context. Moreover, as a result of thorough research of both Canadian and American sources (some obtained through the U.S. Freedom of Information Act), he has succeeded in describing the respective national perspectives which often differed dramatically. Possibly the most fascinating of many episodes in the book is the powerful

influence and apparent duplicity of the late Lt. General Charles Foulkes in the events leading up to the approval of NORAD by the newly elected Conservative government of John Diefenbaker. Just a few days after his new Defence Minister George Pearkes took office, Foulkes appears to have deliberately misled him in minimizing the political significance of the proposed integrated air defence command and in arguing that it was just one more step on the path on which Canada and the U.S. had set out in 1946. Shortly thereafter, Pearkes was able to persuade Diefenbaker who, in his capacity as acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, approved the proposal without consulting any of the officials of the Department.

Professor Jockel's well documented account records that neither the Cabinet Defence Committee nor the Cabinet acted on the proposal except to approve an Order-in-Council confirming the appointment of Air Marshal Slemon as Deputy Commander of the new command. It was only later when the storm broke in Parliament that External Affairs was brought into the picture and a bilateral exchange of notes, was negotiated formally setting up the new North American Air Defence Command. This account also confirms a longstanding impression that the American military authorities were strongly opposed to any substantive link between NORAD and NATO. While they were prepared to accept the type of general reference to NATO which appeared in the bilateral exchange of notes, the U.S. military were successful in shaping the official American attitude which effectively vetoed every Canadian move, including statements by Prime Minister Diefenbaker, to portray NORAD as a NATO command.

One principal conclusion drawn by the author is that North American defence cooperation in the postwar period developed pragmatically in a piecemeal fashion in response to growing Soviet capabilities. There was no U.S. master plan. Rather there existed an odd commonality of interest between the Canadian civilian authorities and senior U.S. officials in Washington who often combined to restrain the ambitious plans of the United States Air Force and their Canadian counterparts. Much credit is given to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence with its mix of civilian and military officials from both countries which ensured that both the Department of External Affairs and the State Department had to be consulted on the key issues. Professor Jockel speculates that had the Board retained its key role after 1953 the Diefenbaker government might well have been alerted to the political implications of proposed changes in the air defence command structure which led to the formation of NORAD.

Professor Jockel's final conclusion is more debatable. He contends that the formality of the final NORAD agreement which referred to the North Atlantic Treaty and the obligation of both governments to consult one another closely, was misleading and resulted in later strains in the relationship. The author may well be right in his assertion that the Americans never saw Canada as anything but a small power. But it is surely unfair to argue that for "Canada...(to) parlay its NORAD participation into a special consultative partnership...(was), at best, unrealistic, at worst, still another attempt by the Diefenbaker government to minimize the implications of the NORAD decision". If, as a good deal of the evidence suggests, the United States authorities had no intention of doing more than paying lip service to the agreement's obligation to consult "on all matters affecting the joint defence of North America" then surely they must share some responsibility for the strains which resulted later, such as during the Cuban crisis, when no effort was made to consult Canada (or any other ally) about U.S. plans which involved *inter alia* U.S. air defence forces assigned to NORAD.

"No Boundaries Upstairs" will be of special interest not only to military historians, political scientists, and defence analysts but also to all Canadians concerned about relations with our large southern neighbour and our continued joint participation in NORAD. The book is relatively short with a wealth of footnotes and an excellent bibliography.

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The Creation of a National Air Force: The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume II. W.A.B. DOUGLAS, ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Press in Cooperation with the Department of National Defence, 1986. xx, 797 p., maps, illust. ISBN 0-8020-2584-6 \$33.95.

This book is the second volume in the long-awaited four volume official history of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Like its predecessor, *Canadian Airmen of the First World War* (See *Archivaria* 12, Summer 1982) it was well worth the wait. Dr. W.A.B. Douglas, Director of History of the Department of National Defence, and his staff were faced with a task that was both more and less difficult than Volume I. They benefitted from the fact that the subject they intended to cover, the RCAF between the wars and its North American activities and operations during the Second World War, was to a very large degree under Canadian military and political control. Thus, a substantial volume of relevant official records existed, though it had to be located and the inevitable lacunae had to be filled. On the other hand, the sheer length of time and breadth of activity to be chronicled in one volume, however large, made the decision concerning the degree of coverage of any given aspect a daunting challenge. The response to this challenge has been a remarkably comprehensive work that leaves an occasional impression of unevenness.

The book is divided into four main narrative parts of roughly equal length. The first deals with the development of Canadian military aviation between the wars and the attempt to do the subject justice in 116 pages of text has resulted in one of the least satisfactory sections. To a criticism that it concentrates too much on policy and high level wheeling and dealing rather than activities and events, the reply could be made that seekers of a narrative history should instead consult F.H. Hitchins' *Air Board. Canadian Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force* (Ottawa 1972). As a reference tool, the Douglas book offers either feast or famine. For example, information on the formation and activities of the prewar auxiliary squadrons is negligible in quantity. The procurement of the first RCAF bombers, Westland Wapitis, is enhanced by a not particularly relevant recollection from a senior air officer while the trials and tribulations in obtaining these aircraft and the fact that they were surplus machines discarded as obsolete by the RAF are ignored. Such omissions can undoubtedly be laid to the compression dictated by available space but it does enhance the perception of unevenness.