interest. This charge prompted a swift and angry denial from the Dominion Archivist, Wilfred I. Smith. In 1973 in *The Canadian Archivist*, Amtmann returned to the attack once again, stating that he was diametrically opposed to archivists and librarians on matters of principle and philosophy. Citing many instances in which Canadian archives were unwilling to pay the going price for important papers, he argued dogmatically that archivists and librarians are custodians of books and documents, historians decide on their historical merits, and experts (i.e. antiquarian dealers) determine their financial value. His last public brawl occurred in 1977 when he issued a pamphlet entitled *A Conspiracy Against the Canadian Identity*, reprinted in *Archivaria* 5 (Winter 1977-78). In his auction catalogues (nos. 99-101), Amtmann had offered for sale the papers of Sir James Robert Gowan at $250,000. Gowan's papers contained some 2,500 letters, including eighty-one from Sir John A. Macdonald. Only one bid had been forthcoming from a Canadian archives (the Archives of Ontario) and at one tenth of the suggested price. The case of the Gowan papers incensed him to the point where he called for a new philosophy of the Canadian heritage. His arguments were unconvincing to archivists such as R.S. Gordon, Peter Moran, and Ian E. Wilson, however, whose commentaries appeared in *Archivaria* 6 (Summer 1978).

Distrustful of bureaucracies and decision by committee, Amtmann did not appreciate that archives have budgetary constraints on acquisitions. He thought that money could always be found somewhere for important material. He mistakenly believed that a refusal to purchase indicated ignorance or indifference. If anything, Amtmann was a gadfly who took upon himself the role of defender of Canadian culture. He spawned a new generation of dealers who were inspired by his sincerity, imagination, and hard work. He was quite aware that often he was unfair, but he preferred to shake people out of their complacency. In this context Mappin and Archer conclude: "If Amtmann argued wrongly that the custodians [archivists and librarians] should always agree with the dealer, his criticisms were incisive and often valid. If some of his shafts went into the clouds, some went into the bull's-eye, and occasionally one went into an overstuffed *derrière*. He woke up a lot of people along the way." (p. 39) Avoiding the dangers of sentimental hagiography, Mappin and Archer have written an honest and poignant account of a colleague who distinguished himself as the most dynamic Canadian bookseller and antiquarian dealer of the period.

Carl Spadoni
Archives, Health Sciences Library
McMaster University

A Man and an Institution: Sir Maurice Hankey, the Cabinet Secretariat and the Custody of Cabinet Secrecy. JOHN NAYLOR. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. xi, 419 p. ISBN 0-521-25583-X

In 1925 Arnold Heeney, a Canadian student at Oxford, wrote in his diary that he had attended a meeting of the Raleigh Club to hear the Secretary to the British Cabinet, Sir Maurice Hankey, speak on "Cabinet Procedure." The talk, he added, was "extraordinarily good." This rather cryptic diary entry contains an inkling of significant later changes in the structure of the Canadian government. In 1938 Heeney became Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Mackenzie King who had informed Heeney that he wanted him to be "a Canadian Hankey." John Naylor's study of Hankey's central role in the

evolution of Cabinet government in Britain from 1916 to 1938 illuminates the British context of developments such as this one in administrative history. Naylor's purpose is twofold: he accounts for the emergence of the Cabinet Secretariat as the central agency for administration of Cabinet business and discusses the Secretariat's impact on the structure and functions of the Cabinet, ministries, and civil service as well as on public affairs in general. His principal conclusion is that Hankey's formative influence on the Cabinet Secretariat was the main force behind the major changes the Secretariat brought about in the conduct of Cabinet government.

The Secretariat was established in 1916 to end the British government's inefficient management of the war effort by installing new administrative machinery for documenting Cabinet business. Naylor argues that the disasters at the front were related to the government's inability to cope with the heavier burdens of a modern war without accurate records of Cabinet decisions. Although Hankey's records-keeping system helped win the war, questions about the constitutional propriety of the Secretariat were raised in Parliament and the press. Some feared that intervention in Cabinet business by non-elected officials in the Secretariat endangered the doctrine of collective Cabinet responsibility. A comprehensive records-keeping operation for the Cabinet survived despite such doubts because postwar problems presented almost as many administrative difficulties as the war itself had and because Hankey's experience in international affairs (about which he had strong views) also made him valuable in an unofficial advisory capacity in the shadows of the Cabinet Office.

Constitutional considerations, administrative necessity, and Hankey's personal advisory role shaped the documentation generated by the Secretariat between 1916 and 1938. To fend off constitutional criticism, Hankey stressed the neutral coordinating function of the Secretariat in documenting Cabinet business and circulating Cabinet documents to the appropriate sub-committees of Cabinet and the departments. To safeguard collective responsibility, the views of individual ministers were rarely identified in Cabinet minutes. Ironically, the need to avoid a procès verbal qualified Hankey's supposedly neutral role. He never merely transcribed Cabinet discussions. He had to distill from wide-ranging discussion a general summary of the grounds for the conclusion reached. This occasionally gave him considerable latitude. One observer of his methods wrote that he was able to "elaborate a conclusion which often had not been expressed in so many words by anyone at the meeting but which was accepted afterwards as representing the outcome of the decision." And on at least one occasion a befuddled minister told an inquiring aide to wait for Hankey's minutes to find out what the Cabinet had decided. Hankey's secretarial duties also became a conduit for more calculated advancement of his preferences in matters of public policy. His skill at drafting documents sometimes enabled him to obtain approval of personal views in much the same way as an actual member of the Cabinet might proceed. By the late 1920s Hankey's command of records made him a prominent and indispensable servant of Cabinet.

A Man and an Institution might have been subtitled "Sir Maurice Hankey and Cabinet Government in the Era of Systematic Records Keeping." By the end of the First World War, documents had become the lifeblood of government business. The speed of their creation, circulation, and absorption came to regulate the pace of government activity. The mounting volume of documents issued by the Secretariat affected governmental structures. With so many documents to be exchanged and assessed, the civil service grew in importance. The Secretariat, which in the 1920s successfully resisted subordination to

the head of the civil service, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, was responsible to Cabinet through the Prime Minister. This strengthened the place of the Cabinet as an institution and the Prime Minister's hand in Cabinet. The Secretariat's editorial control over Cabinet documents circulated to the departments also contributed to a reduction of significant former levels of departmental autonomy. At the political level too, the new era of records-keeping had major effects. The mismanagement of government documents which resulted in leaks to the press or politicians (such as Winston Churchill during the debates on defence policy in the 1930s) could embarrass a ministry and shape political events.

Custody of Cabinet records consequently acquired the utmost importance. The Secretariat countered constitutional questions about its legitimacy and consolidated a place in Cabinet administration by becoming the custodian of Cabinet records. Naylor finds little to commend the custodial regime Hankey helped build. It cloaked public administration in the sort of excessive secrecy which resulted in dubious application of the Official Secrets Act in 1934 to prosecute Edgar Lansbury for unauthorized use of Cabinet documents in a biography of his father, George Lansbury, a former Cabinet minister. That George Lansbury was not charged for making the documents available to his son illustrates the highly selective application of records policies. Indeed, only former Cabinet ministers were granted permission to use Cabinet materials. Historians and other interested persons were not allowed more liberal access to records created after 1916 until the Wilson government opened Cabinet records which were more than thirty years old. Naylor concludes that this restrictive regime (which in all essentials still governs access to Cabinet records in Britain) has adversely affected discussion of British public affairs. Publication of the Crossman diaries in 1975, while bringing wider freedom to former Cabinet ministers to disclose information in Cabinet documents, did not affect the terms of access to those documents for academics and the general public.

A Man and an Institution is an important book for archivists. Naylor demonstrates that study of a major records-keeping administration yields valuable information about the variety and quality of the records, institutional developments, and public affairs. These findings are obviously the basis of informed archival custody of such records; at the same time they invite archivists to pursue their own knowledge of the history of records-keeping systems toward similar contributions to the study of government and society.

Tom Nesmith
National Archives of Canada
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The Science of Social Redemption: McGill, the Chicago School, and the Origins of Social Research in Canada. MARLENE SHORE. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987. xviii, 340 p. ISBN 0-8020-6645-3.

Marlene Shore's *The Science of Social Redemption: McGill, the Chicago School, and the Origins of Social Research in Canada* follows the history of the social sciences at McGill University from the founding of the Department of Social Study and Training in 1918 to the demise of the interdisciplinary approach to the social sciences by the start of the Second World War. No mere institutional or departmental history, this book is an