

concerts in 1964, while McLuhan stopped writing useful books in the same year. Both men continued to work for another fifteen or more years. Other biographers might well address the issue of failure more fully.

While Gould loved Toronto and chose it gladly as the place where he wished to spend his life, McLuhan's feelings toward the city were much more mixed. McLuhan might well have been better advised to work in the United States during his later years. It would appear that many of his real interests were there. Did not McLuhan's later work suffer from the lack of a centre and the lack of a positive context in which to work? If Toronto and Canada did not supply the context McLuhan needed, he probably should have tried elsewhere.

One hopes that, for the sake of archivists and researchers, great Canadians of today are keeping their personal papers on the same scale as Gould and McLuhan did. The National Library of Canada has already produced a major exhibition, an exhibition catalogue, a photo calendar, as well as the computerized finding aids previously mentioned, and the Library intends to publish a full catalogue of the Gould Papers running to six hundred pages and two volumes. Oxford University Press published *Letters of Marshall McLuhan* in 1987, drawn from the McLuhan Papers at the National Archives of Canada and from other sources. Such efforts are not justified (nor likely to occur) except where the collections are complete. Marchand has written a very good biography of McLuhan. Friedrich has given future writers on Gould a place to start.

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Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948. DENIS SMITH. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988. x, 289 p. ISBN 0-8020-5770-5 (cl.) ISBN 0-8020-6684-4 (pa.) \$35.00 cl. \$15.95 pa.

Denis Smith's *Diplomacy of Fear: Canada and the Cold War, 1941-1948* is an excellent book detailing a period in Canadian history where fear, as defined in *Webster's Dictionary* as the "anticipation or awareness of danger," dominated foreign policy worldwide. Smith takes the reader through the labyrinth of Canada's diplomatic relations with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union from the Nazi invasion of Russia in 1941 to the negotiations leading to the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1948. His purpose is to "examine how the Canadian government saw the political confusions of the post-war years from its unique perspective between Britain and the United States, and how it responded to them" (p. 7). The author chronicles the events which shaped the postwar period, such as the Atlantic Charter, the Anglo-Soviet Treaty, the negotiations between the Allies on the opening of the Eastern Front, the various wartime conferences, the Gouzenko revelations, Canadian-American defence arrangements during and after the Second World War, the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, the 1948 Czechoslovakian coup, and the initial negotiations leading to the formation of NATO. Smith's interest lies not in the events themselves, but in the "Canadian government's changing perceptions of the U.S.S.R. and East-West relations: a history of ideas in politics" (p. 9).

In this, he is successful. A fine use of primary sources, coupled with a fair and balanced accounting of the ideas of those involved, at both the political and bureaucratic level, rightly adds *Diplomacy of Fear* to the post-revisionist historiography of the Cold War.

At the start of the Second World War, Canada's Department of External Affairs was small and inexperienced in responding to the types of fears and tensions of the period. Nonetheless, the department responded with fairness, coolheadedness, and a willingness to participate in establishing a new world order. The isolationist tendencies of the 1930s were gone. Smith explains the formation of Canada's foreign policy during these years by first presenting the various events which occurred. He then describes the reactions of the Canadian diplomats in the Department of External Affairs. If there were disagreements between the diplomats, Smith analyses them and describes how in most cases a consensus was arrived at and a policy formulated. The interaction between the bureaucrats and their political masters, Prime Minister Mackenzie King and also after 1946 Secretary of State Louis St. Laurent, are also described. King's traditional isolationism and fear of international involvement is contrasted with the optimistic and activist views of St. Laurent and the diplomats. It is interesting to note that the diplomats were able on numerous occasions to convince a reticent and overly cautious prime minister of the necessity of espousing a more interventionist policy.

Smith follows an established format in explaining the role which fear played in the formation of Canadian foreign policy during the Cold War. He first presents a particular event and then describes the points of view held by the members of the Department of External Affairs. He then explains how a coherent foreign policy decision was made. A good example of this method is Smith's description of the Canadian response to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. Lester Pearson, then Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, asked Dana Wilgress to evaluate the changing nature of world events. In the face of the two superpowers' struggle for power, what should be the Canadian response? Wilgress presented his views in a long memorandum in April 1947, concluding that both the United States and the Soviet Union should be allowed their respective spheres of influence and that a war between the superpowers was not imminent. Wilgress's report was followed by a memorandum by Escott Reid entitled "The United States and the Soviet Union: A Study of the Possibility of War and Some Implications for Canadian Policy." Reid's conclusion was that, even though a world war was not imminent, Canada had no choice but to remain firmly in the western camp. Smith presents this report in detail, analysing it in both style and form. He then places his own comments on the validity of Reid's views alongside those of twelve leading members of the Department, including Charles Ritchie, Hume Wrong, Dana Wilgress, Marcel Cadieux, R.A.D. Ford, and R.A. MacKay, each of whose responses to the Reid memorandum is also analysed. The author concludes by describing the almost inevitable drift of the Canadian government firmly into the western camp headed by the United States. This method of presenting the views held by the members of the Canadian diplomatic community and describing their development works well and gives credence to Smith's purpose that *Diplomacy of Fear* is a "history of ideas," not of events.

There is one major problem faced by the researcher in reading *Diplomacy of Fear*. Smith's primary sources are not fully or correctly documented, thus making further consultation difficult. Smith writes in "Sources": "Most of the unpublished documents referred to in the text originated in or were received by the Department of External Affairs. They are filed either in the Historical Division of the department or in the Public Archives of Canada under a variety of categories" (p. 273). How is a researcher going to find these records without knowing their location? The footnotes are also incomplete. For example, in citing the records of the Office of the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Smith states only that they are the records of that office, not where they can be found. In addition, the footnote includes only a volume number, not a Record Group or file number, and the date of the report. It is suggested, both to authors and publishers, that using the methods found in the National Archives' *Archival Citations* would greatly enhance historical research.

Diplomacy of Fear is a well written and well balanced account of Canada's foreign policy during the early years of the Cold War. The author carefully explains the rationale behind the actions of both the United States and the Soviet Union, and the almost inevitable drift into the Cold War. He describes Canada's place in this struggle and outlines how Canadian foreign policy makers attempted to cope with a world that seemed destined for another world war. At the 1988 Royal Military College History Symposium on the Cold War and Defence, Denis Smith spoke on the role fear played in the development of Canadian foreign policy in the postwar period, and how this fear led to the formation of NATO. He ended his lecture by examining how the international scene has changed in the past forty years. Smith wondered if, as a result of the lessening of tensions between the superpowers in the late 1980s, Canadians should re-examine their place in NATO. *Diplomacy of Fear* should be read by those interested in a careful examination of the early years of the Cold War. With a clear grasp of the past, Canadians are better able to formulate a rational foreign policy for the future.

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The Idea of Loyalty in Upper Canada, 1784-1850. DAVID MILLS. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988. xviii, 238 p. ISBN 0-7735-0660-8 \$27.95 (cloth).

This is a fine book which makes a solid contribution to our understanding of the political culture of Upper Canada. It does so by examining the evolution of the concept of loyalty — according to David Mills, the "central political idea in Upper Canada during the first half of the nineteenth century" (p. 5). Few would quarrel with this assessment; indeed, over the years historians have produced many articles, books, and theses which stress in varying degrees the importance of loyalty in the politics of the colony. This book has significance precisely because Mills provides us with a fresh way of looking at this well-trodden territory.