A Debate on the Validity of Archival Theory

The theme of the 1993 Annual Conference of the Association of Canadian Archivists (held from 19 to 24 July 1993 in St. John's, Newfoundland) was “Between the Rock and a Hard Place: Archival Theory and Practice.” Following the keynote address by Heather MacNeil on the first morning of the Conference (which appears elsewhere in this issue of Archivaria), John Roberts and Terry Eastwood presented their opposing viewpoints on the existence, relevance, and significance of archival theory. The three items appearing below are John Roberts’s presentation, followed by that of Terry Eastwood, and concluding with Roberts’s response. Editor

Practice Makes Perfect, Theory Makes Theorists

by JOHN W. ROBERTS

Terry Eastwood suggested in 1983 that opposition to archival studies emanated from a fear that “we would lose the intellectual substance and status we derive from our roots in historical study” and that “such thinking is a disavowal of the breadth and depth of principle that archivists have striven to build into their practice.” In my opinion, such a fear and such a disavowal are quite well-founded and appropriate.

Archival theory—when it goes beyond a point of diminishing returns—is inflated, pretentious, and virtually useless. It mimics academic methods without producing worthwhile scholarship. It offers scientific generalizations that are neither scientific nor generally applicable. It seeks to create an illusion of archival professionalism, while threatening to dilute the professionalism and authority of the line archivist. It concentrates on the least important and least challenging aspects of archival work—the methods and structures—while diminishing the value of subject matter expertise, which is the one indispensable basis for intelligent and constructive archival work.
Archival theory is valid and useful only in its least ambitious form: the "nuts-and-bolts" or craft literature that describes the rudiments of archival processes. Archival work would be impossible without rote vocational-technical training, and before plunging headlong into archival assignments, the young archivist should spend at least a week in the classroom, thinking deep thoughts about provenance, and grappling with the intricacies of alphabetical versus chronological arrangement, the distinction between the series and the record group, and the nagging puzzle of how to determine when a document is in such poor condition that it needs to be enclosed in mylar. In addition to the functional procedures, useful aspects of the craft literature also include broad guidelines and suggestions (as opposed to immutable laws and rigid formulas) that can help archivists organize their thoughts—such as Theodore Schellenberg’s values of appraisal and Hilary Jenkinson’s reflections upon archival responsibilities.

Further, it is entertaining, if not especially enlightening, for archivists to learn about the history of their calling. It is interesting to know that the French Revolution precipitated decisive changes in archival administration, that requiring arrangement to precede cataloguing was an important step towards the amalgamation of archival methods with the manuscript tradition, that clay tablet archivists could choose between the pigeonhole system, the open shelf system, and the container system, and that the archives building in ancient Athens occupied a central location, close by the generals’ headquarters and the latrine. The archival community is deluding itself, however, if it believes that—apart from shedding a few rays of dim light upon the history of public administration—these archival reminiscences will ever be seen as more than minor details by the rest of the academic community.

Good work continues to be done in craft-related theory. But such work usually is focused on a single theoretical consideration, rooted in a practical knowledge of a specific group of records, and offered simply as insights or optional guideposts, while avoiding the presumption of constructing grand schemes.

A recent article by Richard Carter Davis, for example, presents thoughtful observations concerning Schellenberg’s concept of evidential value that emerged from Davis’s own work with silver-lead mining records at the University of Idaho. Davis makes no grandiose claims for universal scientific applicability, but his insights are so much more reasonable, useful, and even provocative than the sterile and highly-structured megatheories that have been littering the archival landscape in recent years. So, too, Marjorie Rabe Barritt has offered very specific and practical suggestions for archivists who, like her, must cope with the idiosyncrasies of student records and the laws governing their use. Alan K. Lathrop’s article on copyright issues can provide excellent guidance to those engaged in the acquisition and preservation of architectural records. And Charles Dollar, Trudy Peterson, Ross Cameron, Tom Brown, and Victoria Irons Walch have offered much-needed guidance—original, but usually consistent with Schellenberg, Oliver Wendell Holmes, et al.—to help archivists deal with the technical challenge of handling automated records.

The craft literature, then, is at its best when it is limited and specific. When it progresses beyond rote procedures, anecdotal history, isolated guidelines, and a very
few general principles, however, and embarks instead upon a search for all-embracing systems and formulas, its usefulness erodes. Systems cannot encompass the vast differences in historical issues, bureaucratic organizations, records, and researcher needs that archivists must confront; nor can they substitute for the years of study an archivist must devote to a particular subject in order to acquire the competence to make decisions regarding records relating to that subject.

Moreover, such theories labour to impose scientific precision upon a field where scientific precision is impossible. For all the pretence of scientific method in much of the recent literature on archival theory, the most critical archival decisions are based solely and inescapably upon the subjective analysis of records by individual archivists, and thus fall completely outside the scope of any scientific review.

Even Richard Lytle, in a letter to the editor of the *American Archivist* written to call me up short for a smart remark I had made about automated applications to archival reference, conceded that “there may not be any [archival] theory worthy of analogy to the natural sciences.” Yet Lytle’s own “experiments” with different theoretical approaches to reference—complete with flow charts almost as elaborate as Linus Pauling’s early representations of protein molecules—illustrate the problem of combining scientific method with archival theory. Despite his rigorous establishment of question typologies, his identification of dependent and independent variables, and his flawless collection and analysis of statistical data, Lytle’s experiments with content indexing and provenance method—based upon fifteen questions asked of a handful of staff members at the Baltimore Region Institutional Studies Center—cannot be taken as a scientific basis for drawing conclusions about anything apart from the work habits and general competence of a handful of staff members at the Baltimore Region Institutional Studies Center. Furthermore, even if the experiments had uncovered empirical and general evidence of the superiority of content indexing, it would not have altered the importance of provenance method, provenance being one of the few theoretical concepts in archives that is worth anything. To me, the whole study seemed futile and its scientific veneer inappropriate.

Richard Cox participated in and wrote about an experiment to test another theoretical approach: documentation strategy. The experiment lent unexpected and unintentional support to the position that historical scholarship is preferable to archival gimmickry as a basis for reaching appraisal decisions.

The objective of the experiment was no less grand than to “document society”—all of it: everything from agriculture to industry to environmental affairs to labour to health care to recreation and leisure to military affairs to politics and many other concerns. The cosmic nature of the study was leavened somewhat by limiting it to a half-dozen counties in Western New York State. The primary technical advance generated to conduct this study was a fill-in-the-blanks exercise that enabled members of the study committee to indicate whether documentation for a particular facet of society was of insignificant, minimal, moderate, or significant quality. The experiment might have had greater scientific validity had a more precise and objective system of measurement been employed—such as a scale of one to ten.

The study failed to meet its objective because there were too many subject areas under consideration and too few subject experts on the committee. As a result,
committee members felt they were filling in the blanks of their exercise based upon "informed intuition." If there had been enough subject matter experts on the committee, then the committee would have turned into a convention and the outcome would have echoed the famous children’s story about "rock soup."

In that old tale, three or four soldiers returning from battle entered a town in search of a meal. The townspeople, however, had hidden their food and claimed to have nothing. The soldiers said they would feed the entire town, and requested a large cauldron of water and several good-sized rocks. They built a fire and soon had the rocks simmering into what they claimed would be a nutritious rock soup. The townspeople were amazed. As the rock soup was being prepared, one of the soldiers lamented that it was too bad they did not have a few onions—just to liven the flavour a bit. A villager suddenly remembered that he had some onions in his pantry, and retrieved them. Before long, carrots, beef, potatoes, and beans were forthcoming. After their feast, the townspeople marvelled that such a delicious soup could be made from rocks.

Similarly, had the Western New York documentation strategy project begun with the fill-in-the-blanks exercise, and then assembled enough subject matter specialists to fill in the blanks with something more than informed intuition, the experiment might have succeeded. Then archival scientists could have proclaimed the fill-in-the-blanks exercise a master stroke of archival theory.

An award-winning essay by Maureen Jung outlines a more successful application of documentation strategy theory. Instead of trying to document all of society, as the Western New York project did, Jung staked out much more manageable territory: quartz mining in Northern California during the nineteenth century. She credited documentation strategy as the catalyst for her findings. But as I read her fine article, the element of theory seemed to vanish. What made the article worthwhile was not the theory the author invoked but the author’s superior knowledge of the subject, her training in organizational sociology, her mastery of the sources, and her conscientious work as a practicing archivist. My suspicion is that she would have achieved the same results even if she had never heard of documentation strategy.8

One of the most exhaustive theoretical studies of archival methods was the attempt by Julia Marks Young and Frank Boles to capture all the complexities of the appraisal process in a single model. Where Schellenberg erected a few bare girders, Young and Boles added walls, turrets, gargoyles, and verandas, as they proposed at least fifty-eight categories in three separate but inter-related modules on which to base appraisal decisions.9

Appraisal decisions, however, cannot be made by having a mechanical process clank into operation. Aided by a few suggestions of what to consider, rather than hamstrung by theorists’ ideas of archival truth, the appraisal process must be created anew each time it is performed. Different appraisers, different records, different subjects, and different repositories will produce ever-changing combinations of information sources, thought processes, and value systems, that cannot and should not be supplanted by a recipe. Overly intricate guidelines do not facilitate the process or materially increase understanding.
The Young and Boles model is neither an objective nor a scientific solution to appraisal problems, for two reasons. First, the information being plugged into the model will always represent subjective judgment; thus, it can never rise above the less elaborate appraisal models whose common denominator is also subjective judgment. Second, the model can be truncated without affecting ultimate decisions, because it is unlikely that many records have such obscure value or repositories such unclear acquisitions policies that the records would require examination under all categories of the model.

These two considerations in turn demonstrate the essential fallacy of much recent archival theory: the misapprehension that defining the process means finding the key to archival success. The process is only a matter of style or technique. Neither the process itself nor the task of analyzing it is the true challenge of archival work. The thinking work of archives, the demanding work, is rooted in the archivist’s subject knowledge base. Appraisal decisions are always subjective; the more knowledgeable an archivist is about the topic, the more justifiable the subjective decision becomes. At some point—perhaps a little after Schellenberg’s two categories, but well before Young and Boles’ fifty-eight—appraisal theory becomes a drawback. Trying to incorporate every nuance into a perfect construct is not only unnecessary; it also diverts energy and resources from the more important job of learning the records and the subject. The more knowledgeable an archivist is about the subject matter, the less need he or she will have for a follow-the-numbers model. The less command an archivist has of a subject, the less likely he or she could use a model effectively—except, as the Western New York project discovered, as a framework for “informed intuition.” The issue is not that ornate theoretical models such as that proposed by Young and Boles are incorrect. Rather, the issue is that they are superfluous and diversionary.

The irrelevance of systematic archival theory is best illustrated, perhaps, by a documentation strategy model developed by Larry Hackman and Joan Warnow-Blewitt. The Hackman-Warnow-Blewitt model would direct archivists to decide what is important enough to be documented, determine the nature of all available records, gauge the value of records to records creators and records users, consider the extent to which documentation is unique, persuade records creators to improve their record-keeping practices, and endeavour to publicize acquisitions. Archivists, of course, have long tried to do those things. Thus, it may be that the authors’ most perceptive comment was that used to describe a central tenet of their model: “This is not a new idea and is perhaps too obvious to require discussion.”

What is most significant about this model is that Hackman and Warnow-Blewitt acknowledge that it is based on one developed in the 1960s by an ad hoc committee of the American Institute of Physics. A similar plan devised by a Federal Bureau of Prisons Task Force twenty years later led to the establishment of the Bureau’s Office of Archives. That a group of physicists and a group of wardens and criminal justice professors, working independently of each other and without any archival training, could devise documentation strategies so like the Hackman-Warnow-Blewitt model, puts archival scholarship into perspective. It shows that archival scholarship and conscious archival theory are not essential to the development of sound archival practices. Sound archival practices can be based
upon a combination of subject matter expertise and that intangible nemesis of academic method known as common sense.

Even Frank Burke has described much of the craft literature as “unoriginal,” “reportorial,” and “mundane.” He and others have taken archival theory into new realms, borrowing insights from other fields in hopes of fashioning an ideology of archives and suggesting formulas that will help archivists assume a more active and independent role. In so doing, they have taken archival theory from the frequently unnecessary into the utterly impossible.

Gerald Ham has complained, justly, that archivists of the past, handicapped by their limited vision of what was important, tended to document the history of the rich and powerful while neglecting the poor and ordinary. As a result, there was insufficient documentation on urban history, the African-American community, immigration, social welfare, and popular culture. Ham was absolutely correct about this. Urging archivists to remedy these specific deficiencies was a useful service.

But Ham went over the archival edge in suggesting that archival theory could offer a way out of such dilemmas in the future. If anything, theoretical systems—even as they strive to be objective and all-encompassing—tend to institutionalize the prejudices and fashions of the moment when they were created. Intellectual frameworks encourage the kind of group-think and systematized response that are inimical to new ideas and fresh insights.

Dynamic acquisitions policies, Ham suggested, could enable archivists to circumvent the marketplace of historiographical trends. He argued that archivists should cease being “weathervanes,” “moved by the changing moods of historiography.”

Ham’s condemnation of archival “weathervanes,” however, resembles not just a weathervane but a fully-inflated windsock. Every one of the archival insights Ham presented in the 1970s and 1980s were the offspring of historiographical insights of the 1960s and 1970s. Ham’s writings on this topic were no less a product of their times than the outmoded acquisitions policies he castigates were of their own.

The gaps in archival holdings could not have been cited by Ham until historiographical shortcomings had first been identified by historians. If archivists really want to contribute to a more complete archival record, then they must be historians themselves—conducting research, learning what the issues are, discovering gaps in the documentation, making new interpretations, locating new sources. They cannot rely on the empty vessel of archival theory to provide shortcuts to historical enlightenment. As Ham’s own writings inadvertently demonstrate, the historiographical trends of today are the acquisitions policies of tomorrow. It is a cause and effect relationship that is inescapable.

Similarly, Frank Burke has proposed that archival theorists search for formulas to help archivists “rise above their own social and intellectual environment.” That is as meaningless and unobtainable a goal as Ham’s that archivists transcend the historical marketplace. Archivists, like everyone else, should work to be aware of their biases and strive to overcome them, but all human beings are inextricably enmeshed in an infinite number of influences that make up their social and intellectual environment. What Burke is calling for is a magic bullet that no religion,
political ideology, or psychological construct has ever developed or will ever develop.

Burke advocates developing theories that would draw upon a variety of disciplines—in particular, the findings of studies of bureaucratic management and decision-making. Intelligent archival work must incorporate knowledge from many other fields, but such knowledge cannot be distilled into a coherent archival theory that would be useful. If there are theories of bureaucratic organization that could assist an archivist, those theories would be sufficient in their original form and need not be re-stated as part of some cut-and-paste archival theory. Furthermore, bureaucratic structures, centres of power, and record-keeping practices vary so much from organization to organization that any archival theory that attempts to cover them would be either too broad or too specific to be an accurate guide to much of anything. The archivist who would document an organization would do better to study that specific organization to learn in reality how it operated, rather than rely upon generalizations cobbled together by archival theorists.

Michael Lutzger has concurred with Burke’s call to integrate archival theory with bureaucratic theory, and has even suggested that such a concoction could give archivists a unique understanding of bureaucracies that would qualify them to serve as bureaucratic ombudsmen—sitting as the great arbiters within their organizations. When I criticized that approach as having nothing to do with archives, Lutzger accused me of a lack of vision. I prefer to think of it as a reluctance to hallucinate. Archival work is about archives, and not about arbitrating disputes, repairing cars, or engaging in other non-archival pursuits. Of course, some theorists might debate even that seemingly self-evident point. A book reviewer for the American Archivist, insisting that definition of terminology was "among the most exacting exercises," recently spent several pages agonizing over the definitions of value, archives, and records, and concluded that there remained "a considerable way to go." The profession probably does have a considerable way to go if simple definitions require such a high level of analysis.

What makes Lutzger’s argument important, though, is that it is not about archives so much as about power and image. To a profession so accustomed to occupying a low spot on the bureaucratic totem pole, what could raise a greater flush of self-importance than the poignant fantasy that its members could one day stride impressively through their organizations as all-knowing ombudsmen? As such, it furnishes a critical link between the two most vibrant trends in the field: the emphasis on archival theory and the push for standards and recognition.

The noted United States historian Carl Becker argued that the American Revolutionary War was in fact two wars: a war over home rule and a war over who was to rule at home. Likewise, the drive for standards and recognition is both an effort to establish independence and status for the archival profession and a struggle to determine what groups will dominate the profession.

Archival theory is tied to the former objective in that one of its purposes is to burnish the image of the archival profession. As William Joyce has pointed out, archivists have debated theoretical issues not just to advance archival understanding but "to support the claim that we do indeed constitute a profession." Fred Stielow also has held that archival theory is "essential to professionalism."
Richard Cox has felt the hot sting of embarrassment over the traditional view of archivists as "servants... to the academic historian," and promotes archival theory as a tool for improving "self-identity" and achieving "equality" with historians. Just as the Western New York project developed a fill-in-the-blanks exercise to solve appraisal problems, Cox puts forth a checklist, covering such items as training and theory, which must be followed to elevate archival work from the status of a "semi-profession." Much of the literature by Cox, Bruce Dearstyne, Elsie Freeman, and others concentrates on theory as a component of image, and addresses such attendant concerns as recruitment, marketing, and access to resources.21

Theory, then, as a tool to achieve professional status, can be tied to very self-interested goals. I have nothing against self-interest, but I recoil at the prospect of advertising campaigns being gussied up to look like scholarly explorations.

Theory also plays a role in the struggle over who will dominate the profession and set its agendas. It is fuelling the expansion of a profession within a profession: archival theorists and scholars who would seek to analyze issues that require no analysis, to develop models that serve no purpose, and to explain concepts that are self-evident. The professional subordination of practicing archivists to the archival theorists is implicit. Frank Burke is perfectly blunt on this point when he contends that a full-time caste of archival "theologians" should create a "theology" of archives and interpret it for the "parish priests"—i.e., the lowly stack rats—as if they require guidance to help them sort through such perplexing head-scratchers as the five levels of arrangement. Burke’s real concerns were particularly clear when he and I debated archival theory before the Society of American Archivists in 1988. He scarcely mentioned archival theory at all, using it merely as a springboard to promote university control of archival training programs.23

Such an emphasis on theory undermines archivists’ professional integrity. It diminishes their greatest asset— their knowledge of the subject whose documentation is their first responsibility—and replaces it with a mess of pottage consisting of graduate degrees in archival science, functional specialization, certification, and a secular theology designed to make anyone who does not know any better think that archival methods are as complex as nuclear physics.

Terry Eastwood has cited the debate over how archival training can achieve a balance—the right mix of history and archival method.24 But in practical terms, it is an either/or proposition. Either archivists spend years obtaining an advanced education in history or sociology or some other true discipline while picking up a few basics of archival method, and then immerse themselves in the records and become content specialists, or they spend years obtaining an advanced education in archival techniques while picking up a smattering of history, and then specialize in a particular archival function.

The highly rationalized and coordinated operations envisioned in recent archival theory is more typical of steel factories than research-oriented academic professions. The myth of the inter-changeable archivist would become a reality, at least in larger repositories, with reference specialists and project specialists being shunted from record group to record group with minimal consideration for subject
expertise. And with less training in history, and less ability to perform all archival functions over a limited number of record groups, archivists will be deprived of the opportunity to acquire the scholar's mastery of particular subjects that they will need to perform intelligent reference service and to contribute meaningfully to the documentation process. Such professional work indeed requires such a scholar's knowledge, and none of it—not a bit of it—comes from archival theory, or archival methods, or archival training. It comes from graduate training in a subject area and from practical experience in a records collection, and archivists cannot do those things if they are devoting their time to arcana such as the proper definition of archives versus the proper definition of records. For all its hype as a way of enhancing archival professionalism, archival theory seems to me more likely to reduce the majority of archivists to clerks or technicians, with less professional independence, and with insufficient preparation for decision-making and the exchange of ideas.

This is a very old debate. Nearly ten years ago it had already become "a trifle wearisome," in the words of R. Scott James. From Jenkinson’s edict that archivists should not be historians, to Schellenberg’s push to make archivists more like librarians, to the emphasis of Margaret Cross Norton and Paul McCarthy on archivists as managers or administrators, to the very wise counsel of George Bolotenko and Michael Gelting that archivists must belong to the historical research community, the debate over the archival mission has been going on for years.

As Clark Elliott has put it, it is a “battle . . . for the soul of the profession,” and I fully concede that the archival scientists have won. American archivists, led in the wrong direction by the Burkes, the Coxes, the Stielows, and the McCranks, have just about caught up with the Canadian archivists in their appreciation of archival theory and university-based archival training programmes. Clearly, archival theorizing is the wave of the future in the archival profession.

But just because it is inevitable does not mean that it is right. And as I contemplate the archival profession of the twenty-first century, I shudder to imagine how few recruits are likely to be attracted to a lifetime of systems and models and flow charts and methods. And I shudder, too, to imagine how little the archival community will be able to contribute when its members are simply well-trained mechanics, steeped in the theoretical frameworks that will enable them to apply nothing more substantial than their informed intuition.

Notes

1 Terry Eastwood, “The Origins and Aims of the Master of Archival Studies Programme at the University of British Columbia,” Archivaria (Summer 1983), p. 40.
4 Richard Carter Davis, “Getting the Lead Out: The Appraisal of Silver-Lead Mining Records at the

11 Ibid., pp. 17, 30-31.
16 Ibid., pp. 42-44.
18 Michael Lutzger, "Comment on 'Archival Theory: Myth or Banality'," presented at annual meeting of Society of American Archivists, Atlanta, Georgia, August 1988 (typescript in John Roberts’s possession).
25 R. Scott James, “A Wearisome Issue,” Archivaria 17 (Winter 1983-84), pp. 302-3. The topic has become so wearisome, in fact, that I was surprised when the Association of Canadian Archivists invited me to speak on this topic, and even more surprised when I accepted.