papers, held at the National Archives of Canada, amply demonstrate his close attention to details, to every aspect of defence policy, and to the press. Much reform was initiated under his tenure. The Mainguy Report and the Currie Report, which caused so much alarm, were written at his instigation in order to identify and correct problems. It was small wonder that he worked eighteen-hour days and drank far too much. His crushing workload led to the appointment of Ralph Campney in 1952 as Associate Minister in order to free Claxton to concentrate on over-all defence planning, relations with other countries, and general policy while Campney concentrated on daily administrative matters.

Claxton left politics for work at Metropolitan Life in 1954. By 1956, he also became the first Chair of the Canada Council and was influential in its early policies. Claxton continued to contribute until his death from cancer in 1960.

Bercuson records that Claxton’s wife, Helen, destroyed almost all their letters after his death. This action made it more difficult for Bercuson to capture the complete man. Regrettable as that loss is, one respects the choice that was made. Helen Claxton was entitled to protect her privacy and I think most archivists would agree that the disposal of personal papers must be at the discretion of those who originate them. Bercuson deals with this action and with Claxton’s family life with sensitivity and insight. He was protected and supported by his family. To the outside world, he was an enigma. And he remains so.

As an archivist, I am less able to approve of Claxton’s decision to keep aspects of basic defence policy secret. Bercuson’s revelations that this decision was purely political and that it backfired are telling. Claxton found the Canadian press irresponsible and sensationalizing. He went from advocacy and trust to feelings of anger and betrayal. If accurate knowledge of defence policy is valued, then the price was high. Yet, Claxton’s accomplishments were many. As a biographer, Bercuson has provided a well-balanced piece and does well not to dwell on his flaws. There is something old fashioned and absolutely accurate in his portrayal of Claxton as a true patriot.

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In The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Canadian Involvement Reconsidered, Peter Haydon tells the story of Canadian military cooperation with Americans during a crisis that many in this hemisphere remember as the most extreme moment of the Cold War. The story is placed in the broader context of Canadian civil and military relations. Haydon is well qualified for this task, having served on loan to the Royal Navy as the navigator of the British Submarine ALDERNEY during the crisis and with many years of experience in the Canadian navy, including time as a strategic analyst in Ottawa and Norfolk, Virginia. This work, a contribution of original scholarship, appeared first as a Master’s thesis at the Centre for Foreign Policies Studies at Dalhousie University.
In it we learn of problems inherent in Canadian defence policy. Haydon reveals that many politicians did not have well defined concepts of the role of the military in our society. They also did not fully understand the nature of the NORAD agreement and its relationship to NATO. The stringent security requirements of bilateral military agreements ensured that few outside the military understood the content of those agreements and fewer understood the detailed aspects of their implementation. Haydon is critical of those Canadian politicians who seemed unable to grasp the basic implications of Canadian-American defence agreements and their practical workings. Though he does not tie this faulty perception directly to secrecy, it is apparent that secrecy complicated communication and impeded the political process. Full, accurate, and detailed knowledge was limited. Moreover, lack of communication and cooperation between the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence and even within those Departments resulted in serious shortcomings in our government’s ability to respond to the crisis. These shortcomings are well documented in Haydon’s account.

Yet, like other Cold War defence studies, this one is incomplete. Not all the documents Peter Haydon requested were opened and some were only opened in part. While Haydon is careful about what is proven and what is speculation, a revised version may be forthcoming if enough new documents are released. We might ask ourselves why so many Canadian records were severed and others not opened at all. For example, Haydon was denied access to discussions of requests for nuclear arms for Canadian forces during the crisis. The Americans and Russians released full, accurate accounts of their nuclear policies during the crisis some time ago, certainly early during the timeframe when Haydon was doing his research. Even allowing for differences in individual judgement between access officers, the problems he encountered are troubling and reveal serious weaknesses in Canadian access policy.

The excessive secrecy that plagued our government during the Cuban Missile Crisis is still with us. Some of our reluctance to release documents is understandable. The bilateral military agreements are still in force and have changed little in substance over the years. Access policy remains much the same though we acknowledge the end of the Cold War. The consequences of continued secrecy are worth consideration. Effective civil and military relations cannot flourish in an atmosphere where most citizens, most politicians, and most bureaucrats do not grasp the implications of alliance relationships and various defence agreements. Those archivists and access officers who work with historical documents in this area can make a difference by ensuring that Canadian researchers get the fullest possible access.

The Access to Information legislation, which defines the criteria for the release of Canadian government documents, is under review by a number of researchers and some members of Parliament. Those of us who use the Act know some of its flaws. Unrealistic time constraints and too few resources make access to historical defence material difficult. Decisions must be made in the context of current international releases to ensure that we do not violate international agreements. To consult with other countries requires time and expertise and the legislation does not require consultation. The result is that information that is no longer sensitive in
other countries remains closed as no one has the time and resources to research each case.

In addition, underlying assumptions about our own national security need to be examined. If our national security is defined to include the protection of democratic values, to include open public discussion of controversial issues and the right to know, then secrecy can harm national security and actually impede our government’s ability to react to international crises. Our government’s security policy, which operates in conjunction with the clauses related to defence in the Access to Information Act, promotes a narrow definition of national security and concentrates upon potential injury from releases. With regard to technical and scientific information, expert knowledge is needed; again, we are faced with limited time and resources. In these circumstances, secrecy predominates. What is needed are more access officers with a certain depth and breadth of knowledge, the resources to undertake extensive research for key topics, support for the growing international network of expert declassifiers, and close cooperation between countries.

The international conditions have never been better. In a post Cold War world, trust-building between nations is progressing based upon implementation of various weapons verification and inspection agreements and the release of full and accurate accounts of Cold War events. Rapprochement has allowed a unique opportunity for the exchange of historical information between nations; this is the method by which we may come to understand the events of the Cold War and place our own history in an international context. If we fail to do our part, then our story will be distorted, full of gaps and misunderstandings, or it will appear only in the periphery of histories produced elsewhere and from a non-Canadian perspective by countries that are prepared to pay the price.

Peter Haydon’s work is an important step in the right direction. Yet, the non-Canadian perspective is valuable and it is here that I have a minor criticism to offer him. Accounts of the Cuban missile crisis produced in other countries tell us that Canadian problems were not unique. Command and control problems, limits on sovereignty, balancing secrecy and the right to know, and weak civil and military relations were encountered in all NATO countries and may be compared to the extreme conditions being revealed by those who suffered the Cold War in nations of the Warsaw Pact. More extensive treatment of recent international literature would be a desirable addition to any revised edition.

Yet what he has accomplished is controversial and worthwhile. He reveals much about the Canadian military perspective which few of us have been privileged to know. While several of his military and naval colleagues disagree with specific aspects of the work, I think most would agree that his focus upon the weakness of civil and military relations in Canada is correct and very valuable. From the archival perspective, this work allows us to examine the role of information in decision-making and nation-building. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Canadian Involvement Reconsidered tells us how dangerous it is to be uninformed.

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